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NOTES
THE LATEST BATTLEGROUND-ABORTION
GROUPS MEET AT THE CLINIC
All the counseling, all the talking, all the writing your Congressman, all of that
has been done, and sofor that child or those children scheduled to die that day,
in that particularfacility, nothing remains but to place your body between the
victim and the killer. And so the blocking of the doors is just a logicalstep.
-Jayne Bray, anti-abortion activist*
Statistics show that about eighty percent of the counties in America do not have
abortion availablefor the women who reside in those counties. Now, ifyou'ye
travelled all day or overnight, or ifyou'ye spent all your money to come to
Washington, D. C., where abortion is safe and legal and availableand you get
there and there are hundreds of screamingpeople outside the clinic you have an
appointment with, all of a sudden your rightjust doesn't seem to exist anymore.
-Gina Shaw, pro-choice activist**

L Introduction
In 1971, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade
recognized a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion.'
Nonetheless, over the past twenty-two years a battle over this
constitutional protection of abortion has been waged by anti-abortion
and pro-choice groups, as each argues its position before courts and
legislatures across the country. By 1992, in a series of cases

© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journalof Human Rights.
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast, transcript 4183, Oct. 16,
1991).
Id.
'410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Supreme Court held that a woman has the right, in
consultation with her physician, to have an abortion during the first trimester of
pregnancy. Once the fetus is viable, however, the State, in promoting its interest in
human life, may "regulate, and even proscribe abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgement, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 164-165.
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'culminating in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v.
2
Casey, the extent of that right had been greatly limited and still
hangs in the balance.
Over the past few years, the battle over this issue has shifted
from the courts and legislatures to the abortion clinics. Various antiabortion groups have attacked not only the sites where abortions are
performed, but also those who perform these services and those
trying to utilize them. Because of the anti-abortion groups' tactics,
the issue has changed. Today, regardless of the extent to which the
constitutional right to an abortion exists, the practical issue is whether
or not a woman can actually exercise that right.
On October 6, 1992, the Supreme Court heard arguments for
the second time in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic.3 The
Majority held that the Ku Klux Klan Act4 does not authorize federal
judges to bar anti-abortion groups from prohibiting access to abortion
clinics.' As a result, the five-to-four decision written by Justice
Scalia removes a powerful weapon from the hands of pro-choice
groups-the ability to obtain damages, attorneys' fees, and injunctions
prohibiting anti-abortion groups' protests.
This Note will discuss the nature of the controversy between
anti-abortion groups and clinics providing abortions and other
women's health services. It will examine the nature of a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Supreme Court cases interpreting the nature
of a claim under § 1985(3), and its use in the federal courts by prochoice groups and clinics against anti-abortion demonstrators.
Finally, it will examine the arguments presented and the Supreme
2 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe's essential holding
recognizing a woman's right to choose an abortion before fetal viability, while upholding
limitations imposed by a Pennsylvania abortion statute, including parental consent, a 24
hour waiting period, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Id. at 2821, 2823,
2831-33.
' Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). The Supreme
Court heard arguments early in October 1991, but later in the term restored it to the
calendar for reargument, 112 S. Ct. 2935 (1992). It was speculated that a four to four
tie among the justices resulted in the rescheduling so that newly appointed Justice
Thomas could vote. Arguments Before the Court-Health Care-Abortion; Ban on
Obstructing Access to Clinics; 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), 61 U.S.L.W. 3295, 3295 (Oct. 20,
1992) [hereinafter Arguments].
4 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
S Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 753.
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Court's decision in its first case on this issue, Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic,6 concluding with an examination of proposed
legislation, the ramifications of this decision, and other factors
affecting a woman's ability to enter a facility offering abortion
services.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
Section 1985(3) 7 was passed in response to widespread
politically motivated violence in the South after the Civil War. State
authorities were either unable, or unwilling, to prevent this violence!
Defeated Southerners sought to drive out Republicans, Northerners,
and newly freed blacks, with the Ku Klux Klan playing a key role in
these efforts.' The statute was intended to deter the murder and
persecution of newly emancipated blacks, among others, and
subsequently is called the Ku Klux Klan Act.10
In order to bring a suit under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must
demonstrate a conspiracy "for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly any person or class of persons of the equal
6 113 S.Ct. 753 (1993).

7 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988) provides in part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire, or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws; or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in any case of
conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged
therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object
of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Steven F. Shatz, A License to Hunt, THE RECORDER, Mar. 29, 1993, at 10.
9
Id.
'o Shatz, supra note 8; cf. CONO. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 158, 159 (1871)
(describing the action of the Ku Klux Klan members intimidating blacks).
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protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under
the laws." 11 The relevant actions must result in an injury "in his
person or property, or deprive[s] [him] of having and exercising any
right or privilege of a.citizen." 2 The statute awards "damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of
the conspirators. ,13
As originally introduced in the House, the bill provoked
strong concerns that it might become a general federal tort law."4 In
response, a narrowing amendment was adopted which limited the
bill's breadth so it did not create a federal remedy for all tortious,
conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others. 15 The House
sponsor of the original bill, Representative Shellabarger, said:
The object of the amendment is to confine the
authority of this law to the prevention Of deprivations
which shall attack the equality of rights of American
citizens; that any violation of the right, the animus
and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to
the end that he may not enjoy equality of rights as
contrasted with his and other citizens' rights, shall be
within the scope of the remedies of this section."
Two main cases have interpreted § 1985(3). In the first,
Griffin v. Breckenridge," the Court outlined the elements of a §
1142 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

(1988).

12Id.
13Id.
14 See

CONG. GLOBE, supra note 10, at 477-79.

"5Id. at 477-78, 567.
16Id. at 478.
17403 U.S. 88 (1971).

The petitioners were blacks from Mississippi who filed a

damages claim under § 1985(3) against a group of whites from Mississippi. The whites,
believing one of the blacks to be a civil rights worker, stopped their car on the highway,
forced them out of it, and clubbed them. Id. at 89-90. The court of appeals dismissed
the case for failure to state a cause of action. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 410 F.2d 817 (5th
Cir. 1969). In dismissing the case, the court of appeals relied on Collins v. Hardyman,
341 U.S. 651, 661 (1951), which held that § 1985(3) was applicable only to conspiracies
under color of state law. In Griffin, however, the Supreme Court held that § 1985(3)
could be extended to private conspiracies, thus overturning Collins. Griffin, 403 U.S.
at 101. Furthermore, the Court, recognizing the plaintiff's constitutionally protected
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1985(3) claim. First, a court must determine if the defendants
conspired, directly or indirectly, to deprive a person or class of
persons of their constitutional rights.18 One issue in this case was
whether § 1985(3) could address an action against private persons or
whether some sort of state action was required, as in a Fourteenth
Amendment case. 19 The Griffin Court found nothing in the language
of the statute requiring state action. 20 Further, upon examining the
legislative history of the statute, the Court was satisfied that inclusion
of purely private actions reflected congressional intent. 2' The next
issue was the motivation necessary in such a private action. 22 In
order to avoid turning the statute into a general federal tort law, the
Griffin Court required "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
23
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action. "
An additional issue in Griffin was whether denial of the right
to interstate travel constituted deprivation of a citizen's constitutional
right and was therefore a deprivation actionable under § 1985(3).24
The Supreme Court found a firmly established constitutional right to
interstate travel with which neither the government nor private
individuals could interfere. 25 Thus, since the right to interstate travel
is a part of citizenship, its deprivation would satisfy the requirements
of § 1985(3).26

right of interstate travel, remanded the case to ascertain whether the parties in this case
were in fact exercising that right. Id. at 105-07.
"8Id. at 102-103.
'9

Id. at 96-97.

DId.
21 Grifin, 403 U.S. at 100.

"That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, however, mean that
it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of
others." Id. at 101.
23Id. at 102. In a footnote, the Court noted that it did not need to decide whether
a motivation other than race would be sufficient given the facts of this case. Id. at 102
n.9.
24 Id. at 102.
' Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631
(1969)).
26Id.
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In United Brotherhood of Carpentersand Joinersof America,
Local 610 v. Scott," the Supreme Court continued its examination of
the issue raised in Griffin-namely, whether only racially
discriminatory motivation was sufficient for a § 1985(3) claim. The
Court found that a "private conspiratorial discrimination" 2' is not the
type of conduct proscribed by § 1985(3).29 However, the Court did
not fully define the requirements for "animus," merely holding that
"[w]e thus cannot construe 1985(3) to reach conspiracies motivated
by economic or commercial animus. 3o
B. The Controversy
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Roe, the conflict
between pro-choice and anti-abortion groups has become emotionally
charged and controversial. One of the best-known and most active
of the anti-abortion groups, Operation Rescue, has staged protests at
abortion clinics throughout the country.3 1 A federal district court
described the "rescue" tactic used by Operation Rescue as "a
demonstration at the site of a clinic where abortions are performed"
during which "rescuers" intentionally trespass to blockade the clinic's

17 463 U.S. 825 (1983). This case involved a § 1985(3) action against a group of
union members from neighboring towns brought by a construction company.
Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 827-29. Cross, a construction company, had hired non-union
workers to build a pumping station and drainage structure. Local unionized construction
workers, acting under plans made at earlier meetings, assaulted the Cross employees and
damaged the site itself. Id. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs, Scott v.
Moore, 461 F. Supp. 224, 231 (E.D. Tex. 1978), and the court of appeals affirmed that
the Griffin test had been satisfied. Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979, 988 (5th Cir. 1982).
1 Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 835.
29 Id.

" Id. at 838. Dissenting Justices Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan and O'Connor felt
that an economic animus was enough. They found the statute sufficiently broad to
include a vast number of class-based denials of equal protection, stating that civil rights
statutes such as § 1985(3) "are to be given a sweep as broad as [their] language." Id.
at 854.
"' See Rita Ciolli, Abortion Foes Close National HQ, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1990, at
15. In 1990, Operation Rescue had at least 125 locally based organizations nationwide.
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entrances and exits.32 These aggressive tactics used by some antiabortion groups have resulted in violence towards patients and doctors
and damage to clinics. Protestors have been able to cause the closing
of clinic doors for a few hours or cause substantial and costly
damage. For example, in October 1989, anti-abortion protestors
spilled twenty-five gallons of tar in a downtown Pittsburgh abortion
clinic, causing $25,000 of damage." In April 1989, demonstrators
gathered across the country to block access to abortion clinics in New
York, Atlanta, New Orleans, San Antonio, Detroit, Denver and
Being the target of a protest can be a frightening
Seattle.34
experience. Gina Shaw was present at a "rescue" and comments:
The doctor was trapped outside the clinic. There was
one patient inside and several .. .in their cars, in
vans trying to get inside, and I remember a very tall,
dark haired woman coming over the top of myself and
the woman next to me, trying to push us under the
wheels of a van. It was terrifying. It was literally
one of the most frightening experiences I'd ever gone
through and I was there voluntarily to try to stop this.
I wasn't a patient and I was scared!35
As one news reporter said, "[i]n the late 1980's, anti-abortion
activists created a controversial tactic aimed at disrupting abortions
directly, using massive human blockades at abortion clinics.",36 Thus,
anti-abortion forces have a significant impact on the ability of the
clinics to provide both abortion and women's reproductive services.
Section 1985(3) has provided a better remedy for pro-life
32National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1487

(E.D. Va. 1989) [hereinafter NOW].
33Abortion Clinic Cleanup Costs in the Thousands, UPI, Oct. 5, 1989, BC cycle,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File. Both the cleaning firm and the clinic's
insurance carrier asked that their names not be revealed in order to avoid harassment.
Id.
' Michael C. Tipping, Abortion DemonstratorsSquare Offiat Clinics, UPI, Apr. 30,
1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
35
id.
' MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS broadcast, transcript 4183, Oct. 16, 1991)
(quoting Mr. Kwame Holman).
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groups than state claims under trespass, harassment or interference
with business claims. A § 1985(3) injunction can cover large
geographic areas 37 and the plaintiff clinics can recoup attorney's fees
and obtain damages.3 8 For example, a 1990 federal ruling against
Operation Rescue threatened double and triple fines for continued
violations and contempt of court fines for any person attempting to
donate money to Operation Rescue. 39 As a result of these kinds of
decisions, the national headquarters of Operation Rescue closed due
to a lack of funds in 1990.40 Anti-abortionist James Henderson,
attorney for Operation Rescue, summarizes, "[o]ur backs are against
the wall. The judges are trying to crush us and silence us. This is
a declaration of war against pro-life groups." 4 Thus, continued use
of § 1985(3) allows abortion clinics to adversely impact Operation
Rescue and other groups.
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic involved clinics
that perform abortions and organizations that support legalized
abortion.42 A variety of organizations, headed by the National
Organization for Women, brought suit in the district court on behalf
of their memberships, which include women who may wish to use the
services of these clinics.43 The groups sought a permanent injunction
against Operation Rescue to prevent "trespassing on, sitting in,
blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or egress from, any
facility in the Washington Metropolitan area that offers and provides
legal abortion services. "' The injunction was sought in response to
a series of protests staged in the Washington area during two

s7Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Says Klan Law Can't Bar Abortion Blockades,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at 1.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
3 John Purnell, OperationRescue Left Broke by Court Battles, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
10, 1990, at Al.
4 See Ciolli, supra note 31. Operation Rescue went from a paid staff of 23 and a
budget of $850,000 to three volunteer staff members. Purnell, supra note 39.
41 Purnell, supra note 39.
42 Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 753, 758.
" NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1487.
"Id. at 1486. The areas to be included in this injunction were the District of
Columbia, Prince George's County and Montgomery County in Maryland, and Arlington

County, Fairfax County, City of Fairfax, City of Falls Church, Loudoun County, Prince
William County and the City of Alexandria in Virginia. Id. at 1487.
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weekends in November 1989 which resulted in the temporary closing
of clinics in Washington D.C. and Maryland.4 5

At the district court level, the plaintiffs asserted two causes
of action under § 1985(3) and three state claims of trespass, public
nuisance, and tortious interference with business." The trial court
identified four requirements for a § 1985(3) action:
(i) a conspiracy; (ii) for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (iii)
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (iv) whereby
a person is either injured in his person or property or
deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States. 47

The court found that members of Operation Rescue had met "to plan,
organize, coordinate and carry out 'rescue' operations that involved
unlawful means"4 and that such rescues prevented women from
obtaining abortion-related services at the clinics involved.49 The trial
court concluded that a gender-based animus satisfies the purpose
element of Griffin and therefore the plaintiffs satisfied the purpose
and animus requirements of Griffin.5" The court further reasoned that

4s

Id. at 1490.
Clinics . . . were closed as a result of "rescues" on November 10,

11, and 12, 1989. The following weekend, on November 18, 1989,
the Hillerest Women's Surgi-Center in the District of Columbia was
closed for eleven (11) hours as a result of a "rescue" demonstration.
Five (5) women who had earlier commenced the abortion process at
the clinic by having laminaria inserted were prevented by "rescuers"
from entering the clinic to undergo timely laminaria removal.
Id.
NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1492-93 (characterizing a § 1985(3) claim as a "Conspiracy
to interfere with Plaintiffs' Right to Interstate Travel Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)"
and a "Conspiracy to Interfere with Plaintiffs' Privacy Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3).").
47
1d.
4Id.

49 Id. at 1492-93.
50 NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1493.
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since many women travel from out of state to utilize the services
provided at the clinics, the defendants' actions infringed upon the
plaintiffs' constitutional right to interstate travel.51
The plaintiffs also argued that the rescues impacted the
patients' ability to obtain an abortion, a right so fundamental that it
is protected against all interference.52 However, the trial court
concluded that, in light of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,53
which put the right to abortion somewhat into question, this claim
was problematic, finding it "unnecessary and imprudent to venture
into this thicket."54 Thus, the district court declined to decide
whether a § 1985(3) claim could be pursued only on the basis of the
right to obtain an abortion.
The trial court issued an injunction preventing the defendants
from protest activity at the nine abortion clinics involved.55 The
defendants were required to give notice of the injunction to its
members in Northern Virginia, and to file an affidavit outlining how
this notice was given. 56 However, the injunction was effective only
until July 31, 1990 at 5:00 p.m. unless the plaintiffs could show good
cause for an extension. 57 Finally, the district court directed the
defendants to pay the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs.5"
The court of appeals affirmed every aspect of the district
court's decision, finding that "the activities of appellants in
furtherance of their beliefs had crossed the line from persuasion into
coercion and operated to deny the exercise of rights protected by

51Id. at 1489 (stating that approximately 20 to 30% of the patients treated at the
Commonwealth Women's Clinic in Falls Church, Virginia come from outside the state).
52 Id. at 1493-94.
5 492 U.S 490 (1989) (involving the constitutionality of the preamble of a Missouri
statute stating that life begins at conception; the Court held that this was not a regulation
of abortion, but rather a statement of the state's preference for life).
5 NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1493.
5 Id. at 1496-97 (concluding that plaintiffs request for enjoinment of activities
which intimidate, harass, or disturb patients would result in a violation of defendants'
First Amendment rights to express their views on abortion issues).
' Id. at 1496-98 (requiring that the notice include a listing of the consequences
which could arise from a violation of the injunction including contempt of court,
imprisonment, and a $1,500 fine).
IId. at 1498.
'Id.
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'
law." 59
The appellate court specifically noted that a gender-based
animus was sufficient to satisfy § 1985(3).'

C. Supreme Court Arguments
Deborah Ellis, representing the clinics, characterized the
defendants' actions as a national conspiracy to prevent women from
exercising their right to choose abortion.6" She pointed to Planned
Parenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v. Casey62 which noted the
indispensable nature of abortion rights to women's economic and
social standing.63 Ms. Ellis disagreed with the distinction drawn by
the defense that women seeking abortions are merely a subset of the
class of women and not protected, noting that discrimination usually
attaches to a subset of a class.'
Ms. Ellis continued that the
interference with interstate travel present here "couldn't be more
blatant" as it involved actual physical prevention of movement.65
Jay Alan Sekulow, representing Jayne Bray," argued that the
members of Operation Rescue "did not engage in their conduct
because of its effect on women, but because of their opposition to
abortion." 67 He contended that applying § 1985(3) in this instance
would turn the statute into a general federal tort law, especially since
relief is available under state trespass and nuisance laws. 68 Sekulow
continued that women seeking abortions do not constitute a protected
class as required by § 1985(3), noting that a class should be defined
by who people are rather than by what activity they pursue, and that
pregnancy-classifications in general have not been found to constitute

39 National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th
Cir. 1990).
' Id. (noting the similar holdings of at least six other circuits).
61See Marcia Coyle, Abortion Protests, THE NAT'L L. J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 30.
62 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see supra note 2.
63 Arguments, supra note 3.
4id.
6

id.

6Id.

' Coyle, supra note 61, at 30.
6Arguments, supra note 3, at 3296.
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invidious sex-discrimination.69 Finally, Sekulow stated that there was
no intentional interference with the interstate right to travel,
especially since the activists had not distinguished in-state from outof-state travellers in their rescue efforts.70

-John G. Roberts Jr., Deputy Solicitor General, appeared on
behalf of the United States as amicus curiae for the Operation Rescue
defendants. Mr. Roberts stated that the United States appeared in this
case not to defend Operation Rescue's tortious conduct but rather to
defend the proper interpretation of § 1985(3). 7' He argued that
rescues do not interfere with plaintiffs' rights as women, but rather
with their actions as women. 72

I.

The Supreme Court Decision
A. Holding

On January 13, 1993, the Supreme Court rendered its
decision in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, holding that
§ 1985(3) cannot be used against anti-abortion protestors.73 The
majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, White, Kennedy and Thomas. 74 Justice Kennedy wrote a
short concurring opinion, 5 while Justice Souter concurred in the
judgement but dissented in part. 76 Justices Stevens and O'Connor
both wrote dissenting opinions, both of which were joined by Justice
Blackmun.77

69

1d.

70

Id.

Linda Greenhouse, Abortion-Protest Case Resumes in High Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 1992, at A14.
' Arguments, supra note 3.
73 113 S. Ct. 753, 758 (1993).
74 Id. at 757.
73Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
77 id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 799 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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B. The Majority Opinion By Justice Scalia
The majority found that the scope of § 1985(3) does not
encompass claims against abortion protestors.7 Justice Scalia based
this position on three points: (i) respondents have not satisfied the
animus requirement of Griffin; (ii) respondents have not established
that petitioners interfered with a right protected against interference
by § 1985(3); and (iii) the so-called "hindrance clause" of § 1985(3)
was not violated. 79

1. The Animus Requirement
According to the majority, the requirements for a § 1985(3)
action are: (i) a racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory intent
as defined in Griffin and (ii) a showing that the conspiracy was
designed to interfere with rights protected against governmental and
private encroachment as defined in Carpenters.8" To interpret Griffin
to mean that § 1985(3) reaches private conspiracies transforms the
statute into a general federal tort law. 8 Scalia wrote that the only
way to avoid this result was to require an invidiously discriminatory
motivation of a racial or "perhaps" class-based nature as defined in
Griffin, but finds nothing to support extension of such class-based
motivation to the facts presented in this case. 2 Scalia rejected the
notion that the term "class" includes women seeking abortions, since
the term "unquestionably connotes something more than a group of
individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct."83 In response
to the assertion that the discrimination is directed at the class of
women as a whole, Scalia said that such an interpretation would
require a "purpose that focuses upon women by reason of their
sex. "'4 Instead, as the district court found, the record indicated that

78Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758.
79Id. at 758-68.
80 Id. at 758-59.
81 Id.

2

d. at 759.

Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 759.
84 id. at 759-60.
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petitioners' demonstrations were "physical intervention between
abortionists and innocent victims" rather than against women per se. 85
For the intent of the demonstrators to rise to the level of a §
1985(3) claim, it must be shown "(1) that opposition to abortion can
reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex based intent, or (2) that intent
is irrelevant, and a class-based animus can be determined solely by
effect. "86 As to the first point, Scalia reasoned that the demonstrators
did not possess a sex-based intent since common and respectable
reasons for opposing abortion exist, with both men and women on
both sides of the issue.87 Further, the Court held that since it is
essential to require intent in this type of § 1985(3) claim, to do
otherwise is to say that "since voluntary abortion is an activity
engaged in only by women, to disfavor it is ipso facto to discriminate
invidiously against women as a class. "88 Relying on equal protection
sex-discrimination cases such as Geduldig v. Aiello' 9 and Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney,9° the decisions of the Court do not indicate
that such action is discrimination against women. 9' Following its
decisions in Maher v. Roe 92 and Harrisv. McRae,93 the Court held
that these types of cases do not require the heightened scrutiny
standard used for sex-based discrimination, but only the ordinary
rationality standard.
In concluding, the opinion characterized the animus intended
by § 1985(3) as follows:

" Id. (citing Bray, 726 F. Supp. at 1488).
'6 id. at 760.
87Id.
88Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760.
89 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities
from a state disability insurance program did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
The Court found that the ability to divide the recipients into two groups, pregnant and
non-pregnant individuals, was not a discriminatory classification. Id. at 496-97.
90 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) "Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker...
selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id.
91Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 760.
9' 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
9' 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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Whether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of
preventing abortion, that goal in itself does not
remotely qualify for such harsh description and for
such derogatory association with racism. To the
contrary, we have said that "a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion" is proper and
reasonable enough to be implemented by the
allocation of public funds . .

.

. This is not the stuff

out of which a § 1985(3) "invidiously discriminatory
animus is created. ,4

2. Interference With a Protected Right
The Court interpreted Carpenters as requiring an intent to
deprive persons of a right which is protected from private
interference. Respondents contended that the right to interstate travel
was impeded in this case, a right which is "in at least some contexts,
a right constitutionally protected against private interference." 95
However, it is not enough that a right be incidentally affected; the
96
right must be the target of the action, not merely a by-product of it.
From the record, only local travel was impeded by the
demonstrations and that is not an infringement on interstate travel. 97
Respondents contended that petitioners intentionally impaired
their right to an abortion. The Court conceded that this was the focus
of the petitioners' actions, but continued that "deprivation of that
federal right (whatever its contours) cannot be the object of a purely
private conspiracy. " Citing the finding in Carpentersthat a private
conspiracy aimed at First Amendment rights does not violate §
94Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 762 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
95 Id. at 762 (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-106).
9 Id. at 762-63 "Petitioners oppose abortion, and it is irrelevant to their opposition
whether the abortion is performed after interstate travel." Id.
' Id. at 763 "The federal guarantee of interstate travel does not transform state-law
torts into federal offenses when they are intentionally committed against interstate
travellers. Rather, it protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens: "the
erection of actual burdens to interstate movement" and "being treated differently" from
intrastate travelers." Id.
6 Id. at 763.

142

NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XI

1985(3)," the Court held that the statute does not apply to actions
targeting a right which is, by definition, only a right against state
interference. " Section 1985(3) addresses only the interference with
rights which are specifically protected against private interference, a
category from which the Court excludes abortion."0 '
3. Hindrance Clause
The Court addressed whether the petitioners violated the
second clause of § 1985(3)-what the majority termed the "hindrance
clause."" ° First, he notes that the respondents admit that their
complaint did not include a claim under this portion of the statute. 3
Further, since neither the district court nor the court of appeals
considered such a claim, it should not be considered by the Supreme
Court." In dicta, however, the Court noted that even if the issue
were properly before the Court, the respondents would not have
stated a valid claim since the hindrance clause requires the same
elements of animus as the initial clause of § 1985(3)."' Even if the
requisite animus were present, the hindrance clause argument would
also fail since there is no constitutional right protected against the
private encroachment at issue.1°

99 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 763.
100 Id. at 764.
"'

Bray, 113 S.

Ct. at 764.

Only the 13th Amendment protection against

involuntary servitude and interstate right to travel are protected from official as well as
private interference. To include abortion in those rights would give it a preferred place
over First Amendment rights to free speech, which were not afforded similar protection
in Carpenters. Id.
102Id.
103 Id.
'04
'o

Id. at 764-65.
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 765.

'"' Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 765.
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4. Attorney's Fees
Since no relief was available under § 1985(3), the Court
vacated the prior award of attorney's fees.1" 7 Although petitioners
claimed that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since
the § 1985(3) claim was so attenuated and asked that the injunction
be vacated and the entire claim be dismissed, the Court did not find
the § 1985(3) claims to be so "wholly insubstantial and frivolous" as
to deny subject matter jurisdiction. 0 8 However, the case was
remanded for a determination of whether the injunction entered by the
district court under state law claims should be sustained in light of
this opinion.

5. Conclusion
The majority in Bray found that while trespass is unlawful in
every state, and may give rise to state-based criminal and civil
actions, such actions do not automatically "give rise to a federal
cause of action simply because their objective is to prevent the
performance of abortion any more than they do so when their
objective is to stifle free speech.""l 9
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy stated that the
"[dissenting Justices'] inability to agree on a single rationale (for a §
1985(3) claim) confirms, in my view, the correctness of the Court's
opinion. "11o Nonetheless, Kennedy proposed an alternative statute for
recourse for the clinics-42 U.S.C. § 10501.1 Kennedy believes

Id. at 767-68.
1'0Id. at 768.
'07

109Id.

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
..Id. at 769. When "state and local resources are inadequate to protect the lives
11

and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law," this statute empowers the
Attorney General to put federal law enforcement resources at the disposal of state
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this statute is the more appropriate medium for protecting the federal
rights of the respondents and others in a similar situation.1 2
D. Justice Souter's Concurrence In Part and Dissent in Part
Justice Souter adhered to the definition of class-based animus
requirement formulated in Griffin and Carpenters, and its
applicability to private actions. 1 3 "I know of no reason that would
exempt us from the counsel of stare decisis in adhering to this settled
statutory construction, which Congress is free to change if it should
think our prior reading unsound. ""
However, Souter believed that the hindrance clause, which he
In
called the prevention clause, was properly before the Court.'
fact, he noted that respondents should have been permitted to include
a supplemental brief addressing this issue, a request which was
denied by the Court.1 6 He addressed whether the additional
conditions defined in Griffin and Carpenter should be included in an
analysis under the second clause," 7 noting that the clause should be
read independently, focusing on its plain meaning."' Justice Souter
conceded that the conditions imposed on § 1985(3) by Griffin and
Carpenter probably took the statute away from the areas Congress
intended it to address, concluding that to impose these requirements
on the prevention clause would work the same result."19 He reasons
that the prevention clause does not carry the possibility of becoming
a general federal tort law and therefore does not require any limiting

government. 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (1988).
2 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769.
'Id.
14

at 769-70 (Souter, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. at 770.

I"
id. at 770.
,,6
Id. at 770-71.
"7 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 771.
118id.
219 Id.

at 771 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1993]

ANTI-ABORTION PROTESTS

145

conditions.120 Further, Souter found the private action requirement
in contravention of the prevention clause itself. 2 ' He would include
conspiracies designed to "hinder or prevent law enforcement
authorities from giving normal police protection to women attempting
1 22
to exercise the right to abortion" in the prevention clause's reach.
The denial of civic benefits to a group because they seek something
guaranteed by the Constitution would be a classification for a
forbidden reason, i.e., a violation of equal protection.1 23 In closing,
Justice Souter recommended that the court of appeals decision
be
24
vacated and the case remanded for consideration of this issue.1

E. Dissent-Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens relied on his interpretation of the legislative
history of § 1985(3) and the plain language of the statute in
disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of the animus
requirement. 125 The interference with interstate right to travel
constitutes deprivation of a constitutional right under § 1985(3), and
Stevens found the hindrance clause to be a viable alternative for the
clinics.

"20Id.

at 775. "[Iln order to satisfy the requirement of affecting the law enforcement

system sufficiently, such a conspiracy would need to envision action capable of
countering numbers of officers or injuring their responsive capacity" and this
requirement in and of itself prevents this section of the statute from becoming a federal
tort law. Id. at 775-76.
121Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 776.
122 Id.
' Id. at 777. "When private individuals conspire for the purpose of arrogating and,
in effect, exercising the State's power in a way that would thus violate equal protection
if so exercised by state officials, the conspiracy becomes actionable when implemented
by an act 'whereby [a person) is injured in his person or property, or deprived of...
any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3)).
" Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
175Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1. Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation
Justice Stevens asserted that the text and the legislative history
of the statute and Supreme Court precedents support the respondents'
position,' 26 finding that the majority ignored the intent, history and
27
language of § 1985(3) in a misplaced reliance upon prior precedent.
Congress' intent and the plain meaning of the statute clearly covers
the petitioner's actions, 2 8 since "[the rescue] presents a striking
contemporary example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated,
lawless conduct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act in
1871 and gave it its name.' 2 9 Although Congress did not anticipate
the use of the statute for women in this type of situation, Stevens
does not believe there is "a sufficient reason for refusing to construe
the statutory text in accord with its plain meaning, particularly when
0
that construction fulfills the central purpose of the legislation. "13
Further, a narrow reading of Griffin is necessary only where
there is a fear that a broad interpretation will result in § 1985(3)
becoming a general federal tort law.3' However, Stevens does not
find this case to be such an instance. In Griffin, the Court noted "a
sufficient reason for rejecting the doctrine of stare decisis whenever
it would result in an unnecessarily narrow construction of the statute's
32
plain language. '
2. Animus Requirement
Justice Stevens characterized the animus component as
requiring a demonstration: (1) that opposing abortion can be
presumed to be a sex-based intent or (2) that a class-based animus can
33
be shown merely from the effects of the action, not the intent.1

Id. at 779.
Id. at 783.
- Id. at 783.
'9 Id. at 782.
'30 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 785.
131 Id.
"6
"7

132Id.
133Id.
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a. Sex-Based Intent
The majority's characterization of the animus requirement as
"a malevolent form of hatred or ill-will" is not supported by
Griffin,t34 since the Court did not require a showing by the plaintiffs
that the beatings they received were caused by a hatred for AfricanAmericans.135 Stevens state that finding a class-based animus in Bray
"does not require finding that to disfavor abortion is 'ipso facto' to
discriminate invidiously against women."136 Instead, a conspiracy
involving force which prevents a woman from asserting her
constitutional right to an abortion "may 'reasonably be presumed to
reflect a sex based intent. ,137 Because women are a protected class,
and because this conspiracy is directed toward conduct in which only
women may engage, these actions are included in the animus
requirement.138 Since only women travel to abortion clinics, the
activities of petitioners are clearly directed toward women.139 Justice
Stevens questioned the majority's view that discrimination is
presumed only when there is no rational basis for opposition to a
behavior or trait. 4 ' The mere fact that not every woman wants or
believes in abortion does not mean that there is no longer any
discriminatory intent."' The entire purpose of such legislation,
Stevens continued, is for the Court to "see through the excuses-the
'rational' motives-that will always disguise discrimination. "1142

Id. at 786 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'3s Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 786.
136 Id. at 787.
'3

37 Id. at 787 (quoting majority opinion at 760).
"8 Id. at 787. "It is not necessary that the intended effect upon women be the sole
purpose of the conspiracy. It is enough that the conspiracy be motivated 'at least in part'
by its adverse effects upon women." Id.
139Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

"4 Id. at 788. This interpretation makes sense "only if every member of a protected
class exercises all of her constitutional rights, or if no rational excuse remains for
otherwise invidious discrimination." Id.
141 Id.
'42 Id. at 789.
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b. Effect, Not Intent

Justice Stevens found that as a matter of statutory
construction, treating the instant case as satisfying the class-based
animus requirement would in no way turn § 1985(3) into a federal
14
tort law or cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the statute.
Stevens disagreed with the majority's reliance upon the disability
benefits and abortion funding cases to deny the required animus in the
present case, stating that those cases did not address the same issues
involved here-namely, statutory protection of citizens from
interference with their constitutional rights. 1" Stevens questioned the
majority's reliance on Geduldig v Aiello, noting that the holding was
not that pregnancy-based classifications never run afoul of equal
protection, but that "not every legislative classification based on
pregnancy was equivalent, for equal protection purposes, to the
explicitly gender-based distinctions struck down" in other Supreme
Court cases.' 45 He noted that the holding in Geduldig depended
upon the fact that it was an insurance system which applied to both
men and women. Stevens wrote:
The distinction between those who oppose abortion,
and those who physically threaten women and obstruct
their access to abortion clinics, is also more than
semantic. Petitioners in this case form a mob that
seeks to impose a burden on women by forcibly
preventing the exercise of a right that only women
possess. 146
Additionally, the abortion-funding cases cited by the majority turn on
the difference between
monetary benefits being denied and burdens
47
being imposed.

'43
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 789.
144

Id.

'4'

id. at 789.

'4

Id. at 789-90.

'47

Id. at 789-90.
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Any law which burdens pregnant women is sex-based
discrimination, since only women can become pregnant.1 4 Justice
Stevens noted the agreement of Congress with this belief in its
adoption of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act t49 which rejected
Geduldig and stated that discrimination based on pregnancy was
In further support of this
prohibited sex discrimination.150
proposition, Stevens cited the Supreme Court decision in Automobile
Workers v. Johnson Controls15 ' which found a policy discriminatory
"because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the
employees in the same way as it applies to that of
company's male
152
the females.
Finally, Stevens asserted that the majority confused the
scienter requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 241153 with the requirements of
§ 1985(3)-although § 1985(2) did contain criminal sanctions, these
Thus,
strict intent
were found unconstitutional in 1883.1
1 55
claim.
1985(3)
§
a
for
requirement is not proper

148Bray,

113 S. Ct. at 789-90.

149 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)). This
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination against
pregnant women. Stevens noted that in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
v. EEOC, the Court stated that "discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its
face, discrimination because of her sex." 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
SO Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 790-91.
"l 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that a fetal protection policy that excluded women
capable of having children from certain positions which required exposure to lead, was
discriminatory on its face, not merely in its effect).
12 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 791 (citing Automobile Workers v . Johnson Controls, 499
U.S. 187 (1991)).
' Id. at 793.
1 Id.
' Id. at 793-95. In a footnote, Justice Stevens noted that Grifin itself rejected the
notion that § 1985(3) contained a specific intent requirement. In fact, the Court said that
the "motivation requirement of § 1985(3) must not be confused with the test of 'specific
intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of
'" Id. at 794 n. 33 (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S at 102 n.10).
law ....
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3. Interference With a Protected Right

The right to interstate travel is inseparable from the
respondent's right to seek an abortion."" According to Justice
Stevens, the majority has misinterpreted the right to interstate travel
as protecting only interferences which discriminate against nonresidents. He disagreed with the Court's finding that as long as equal
burdens are imposed on local travellers, no burden on interstate travel
has been imposed.157 He wrote that "discrimination is a necessary
element of the class-based animus requirement, not of 58the
abridgement of a woman's right to engage in interstate travel."
4. Hindrance Clause
Justice Stevens found that the respondents stated a clear case
under the so-called hindrance clause. 59 "A conspiracy that seeks to
interfere with law enforcement officers' performance of their duties
entails sufficient involvement with the State to implicate the federally
protected right to choose an abortion and to give rise to a cause of
action under § 1985(3). "'" Whether there is a class-based animus
requirement for this clause has not yet been determined, but Stevens
postulates that the holding in Kush v. Rutledge, 6 ' which did not
impose such a requirement, would apply in this case as well. 162 In
addition, the equal protection language added to that section would
prevent an overbroad sweep of power.' 63
Finally, Justice Stevens stated that a class-based animus could
be inferred if the activities engaged in burdened an activity

Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 782.
isd. at 793.
Is'at 795.
Id.
,5Id. at 798.
160
Id. at 796.
161460 U.S. 719 (1983) (interpreting § 1985(2) and rejecting the idea that the
"s

plaintiffs had the burden of proving animus as defined in Griffin).
" Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 796.
'6'Id. at 797.
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predominantly pursued by members of the class." It would comply
with Griffin and the hindrance clause to find that the "clause
proscribes conspiracies to prevent local law enforcement authorities
from protecting activities that are performed exclusively by members
of a protected class, even if the conspirators' animus were directed
at the activity rather than at the class members." 65 Stevens found
that the hindrance claim, on its own, would constitute appropriate
grounds for affirmance by the court of appeals."'
5. Conclusion
In closing, Justice Stevens wrote:
Indeed, the error that infects the Court's entire
opinion is the unstated and mistaken assumption that
this is a case about opposition to abortion. It is not.
It is a case about the exercise of Federal power to
control an interstate conspiracy to commit illegal acts.
I have no doubt that most opponents of abortion, like
most members of the citizenry at large, understand
why the existence of federal jurisdiction is appropriate
in a case of this kind. 167
This final comment seems to imply that the majority opinion does not
reflect a true reading of § 1985(3), but rather is a reflection of their
stance on the abortion issue.
F. Justice O'Connor'sDissent
Justice O'Connor's approach to § 1985(3) focuses on the
legislative intent of Congress and the plain meaning of the statute.
16

Id.

I6 Id.
166Id.
167Bray,

113 S. Ct. at 798.
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In examining the legislative history of § 1985(3), Justice O'Connor
noted that, in general, "[tihe Court's approach to Reconstruction Era
civil rights statutes has been to 'accord [them] a sweep as broad as
[their] language."'168 She determined the majority does the exact
opposite by "precluding application of the statute to a situation that
its language clearly covers." 69 The evidence in the record clearly
places the respondents within the purview of the statute.' 7
Justice O'Connor discussed the class-based animus
requirement in light of the case law and legislative history of the
statute. 7 ' A narrow construction of Griffin is an attempt to ensure
72
that § 1985(3) does not become a broad federal tort statute.1
However, the legislative history should be controlling in determining
the nature of animus.
She found the clearest statement of
Congressional intent in the words of Senator Edmunds:
[Congress was not] undertak[ing] in this bill to
interfere with what might be called a private
conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud...
[but, if] it should appear that this conspiracy was
formed against this man because he was a Democrat,
if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or
because he was a Methodist, or because he was73 a
then this section could reach it.
Vermonter, .
O'Connor found the Grifin description a valid representation of
Congressional intent, and believes the narrowing of Carpentersand
subsequent cases violate it.' 74
Section 1985(3) applies to conspiracies which target a genderbased class and includes petitioners' actions in that category.'
At

" Id. at 799 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 801 (1966)).
'6 id. at 799.
170Id.
17' Id.

at 800.

72 Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 800.
173Id.

(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 567 (1871).
74Id. at 801.
175id.
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a minimum, O'Connor noted, the classes under § 1985(3) should
include those classifications that the Court has determined merit
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 176 Genderbased classifications, like the one in the present case, are within this
range of classifications. 177 O'Connor agreed with Justice White's
dissenting opinion in Great American Federal Savings & Loan v.
Novotny 78 that "it is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently
invidious to come within the prohibition of Section 1985(3). 179
Finding that women are a protected class within § 1985(3), Justice
O'Connor reasoned that the statute "must reach conspiracies whose
motivation is directly related to characteristics of that class. The
victims of petitioners' tortious actions are linked by their ability to
become pregnant and by their ability to terminate their pregnancies,
characteristics unique to the class of women. 180
Justice O'Connor found no merit in petitioners' assertion that
their actions were motivated by their firm belief that abortion is
wrong, rather than by a discriminatory animus. 81 While noting that
she was not questioning the sincerity of these beliefs, O'Connor
commented that there are other avenues of expression open to them
which would not infringe upon the interests of the respondents. 82
She questioned the majority's finding that it is irrelevant to a finding
of animus that unlawful means were used to achieve the goal.' 83 The
unlawful treatment of lawful activities is a class-based deprivation
within the reach of § 1985(3)."' As to the majority holding that in
light of the Equal Protection Clause the discriminatory animus has not
been met, O'Connor proposed that a state action requiring a higher
standard was not at issue. 8 5 The difference between the heightened
animus standard under equal protection and the animus standard

176Id.

Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 801.
'7' 442 U.S. 366, 389 (1979).
"

179 Id.

'goBray, 113 S. Ct. at 801-02.
...Id. at 802.
192 Id.

183Id.
1" Id. at 801.
' Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 803.
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under a private-action based § 1985(3) claim is critical."sn "Griffin's
element of class-based discrimination is met whenever private
conspirators target their actions at members of a protected class, by
virtue of their class characteristics, and deprive them of their equal
enjoyment of the rights accorded them under law." 187 Further, as to
the Court's definition of "invidious" used to sustain this
interpretation, O'Connor noted that such reasoning might be correct
if that term were in the words of the statute, but it is not. 18 An
examination of the language in Griffin should not be used as a
substitute for Congressional intent.189
Justice O'Connor stated that reliance upon Geduldig is also
misplaced because that case involved a state action, not a claim
involving private parties. 90 She noted that Congress has again made
clear its "position that showing subjective intent to discriminate is not
always necessary to prove statutory discrimination"191 in its recent
Civil Rights Act of 1991.192 Justice O'Connor was also willing to
base her entire reasoning on the hindrance clause of § 1985(3).193
She agreed with Justice Stevens that the respondents could sustain
their claim under this second clause of § 1985(3).1"
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor noted that the Court breathed
new life into § 1985(3) by overturning of Collins v. Hardyman'95 in
Griffin, thereby providing a return to Congressional intent.1 96 "Today
the Court takes yet another step in restricting the scope of the statute,
to the point where it now cannot be applied to a modern-day
paradigm of the situation the statute was meant to address. "197

ISO
ld. at 804.
187Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.

"0 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 803.
191

Id.

'9' 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. III 1991).
'" Bray, 113 S. Ct. 804-05.
194Id.
19' 341 U.S. 651 (1951); see supra note 19.

"6 Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 805.
197Id.
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III. Anticipated Aftermath and Concluding Remarks
With the Bray decision, the fate of at least twenty federal
court injunctions presently preventing protests at various abortion
clinics hangs in the balance. 98 Pro-choice groups anticipate an
increase both in the number of protests at abortion clinics and in the
number of individuals participating in such activities.'" Kathryn
Kolbert, an attorney from the Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy notes:
This decision is like giving license to violence, almost
like chumming for sharks. If you dump the blood,
they come around. And this decision will encourage
a lot of marginal people to step up their attacks on
abortion clinics. We've had forty-three chemical
attacks on abortion clinics in the last nine months, and
it's going to get worse. 20
On Wednesday, March 11, 1993, as Dr. David Gunn walked toward
the back door of the Pensacola Women's Medical Services clinic in
Florida where he performed abortions, he was shot in the back by
Michael F. Griffin.2"' On August 20, 1993, Oregon housewife
Rachelle Shannon was arrested in the shooting of Dr. George Tiller
of Wichita Kansas; 2 2 Dr. Tiller survived the attack and reported to
work the next day. 213 Ms. Shannon was an ardent anti-abortionist,
who believed Michael Griffin to be "the awesomest, greatest hero of
our time. ,24
Anti-abortion groups see the decision as "neutraliz[ing] a
powerful weapon against them."2" 5 Keith Tucci, Executive Director

' Tamar Lewin, Abortion-Rights Groups See A Rise in Attacks on Clinics, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at D25.

199Id.
2W id.

The
s Death of Dr. Gunn, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at Al.
o Tony Rogers, Slay Suspect's Fan, DAILY NEWs, Aug. 23, 1993, at 18-19.
Zachary Margulis, The Violent Struggle, DAILY NEWS, Aug. 23, 1993, at 18.
204Rogers, supra note 202.
05 Id.
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of Operation Rescue, said that a lawsuit under § 1985(3) "was a great
intimidation tactic for people who said, 'Look, that's what can
happen if you get involved with Operation Rescue.' What this
decision tells people is that it is perfectly legal to protest the killing
of unborn babies. ,206

A. Legislative Response
On February 3, 1993, a bill was introduced to the House of
Representatives by Representative Charles E. Schumer, a Democrat
from Brooklyn. 2 7 The Senate version was introduced in the Senate
by Senator Edward Kennedy on March 23, 1993.208 The Senate
version of the bill has been adopted, but in early April 1994,
disagreement between the houses on amendments to the bill resulted
in the scheduling of additional conferences between the House and the
Senate.20 9
The current version of the bill, the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act of 1993, would be an amendment to the Public
Service Health Act and would ensure freedom of access to medical
clinics and related facilities.2"0 The penalties for its violation would
include jail sentences and civil remedies. 1
Part of the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose
explicitly discusses the decision of the NOW case as an impetus for
this legislation.

206
Lewin, supra note 198.
2 S. 636, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 2715 (1993).

Freedom of Access to Clinic

Entrances.
208Id.
209S. 636, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. §2715 (1994).

Freedom of Access to Clinic

Entrances.
2"0 "Whoever, by force, threat of force, or physical obstruction, intentionally injures,
intimidates or interferes with any person, or attempts to do so, because that person or
any other person or class of persons is obtaining or providing reproductive health
services; or intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility or attempts to
do so, because that facility provides reproductive health services; shall be punished."
Id.
211id.
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In the Bray decision, the Court denied a remedy
under [Section 1985(3)] to persons injured by the
obstruction of access to abortion services; legislation
is necessary to prohibit the obstruction of access by
women to abortion services and to ensure that persons
injured by such conduct, as well as the Attorney
General, can seek redress in the federal courts.21 2
By April 1994, the bill had thirty-one co-sponsors in the Senate
(twenty-seven Democrats and four Republicans), 23 and 128 cosponsors in the House (133 Democrats and 15 Republicans). 1 4
Anti-abortion groups believe that such a law would interfere
with their demonstrations against abortion, claiming further that
individuals like Mr. Griffin do not represent their members as a
whole.21 5 Olivia Gans, a member of the National Right to Life
Committee, says:
The clinic access bill is a sham. The murderer could
have walked up to Dr. Gunn any place, any time, and
the bill would not have prevented the murder. Any
effort on the part of Congress to gag pro-lifers will be
unacceptable. The bill is not a middle ground. 1
However, despite the expected opposition from anti-abortion groups,
the Administration seems to be behind the bill. In a recent interview,
Attorney General Janet Reno expressed the support of her office.
She said:
I have asked our staff to work with congressional staff
to do everything possible to develop legislation that
addresses these issues in the most effective manner
possible. Passage of this legislation is a priority, it is
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important and we're going to work with Congress to
secure passage of it. 217

This is a drastic change from the implicit encouragement of
harassment of abortion facilities of prior administrations.218
In addition, many cities have passed laws addressing the issue
of anti-abortion protests. 21 9 For example, two Cleveland suburbs ban
picketing directed at specific homes, and both Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania and San Jose, California have passed laws making it
illegal to inhibit patients' access to abortion clinics.220
B. Judicial Response
1. The Hindrance Clause
Another possibility is a case under the hindrance clause of §
1985(3). With Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Blackmun, and Souter
expressing their views that such a claim could be sustained on the
facts of Bray, it is possible that such a cause of action could prove
successful. Justice Kennedy could be persuaded to join such an
opinion since he seems to be attempting to find a forum to allow
respondents relief.22'
2. The Members of the Supreme Court
The entire makeup of the Court seems to be changing. On
March 20, 1993, Justice Byron White announced his retirement.222
During the selection process President Clinton stated that he would
"not ask any potential Supreme Court nominee how he or she will
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vote in any particular case. "23 However, he did say that he "will
endeavor to appoint someone who has an attachment to and belief in
a strong and broad constitutional right to privacy. "'2 Ultimately,
President Clinton selected and the Senate approved Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.225 During the nomination hearings, Ginsburg stated that
the right to choose to have an abortion is an essential part of equality
for women.226 In general, she believed that "Congress makes the
policy. It writes the laws. People elect members of Congress to
make laws for them, and if people don't like those laws, they can
vote out the people who make them. "227 However, she continued,
"when political avenues become dead-end streets, judicial intervention
in the politics of the people may be essential in order to have
effective politics. "22' Thus, it is highly likely that Justice Ginsburg
could take a stand with the dissenters in Bray.
In April 1994, Justice Harry A. Blackmun announced his
plans to retire. 22 9 Thus, President Clinton will again have the
opportunity to fill a Supreme Court vacancy and influence its makeup. 230 Further, it is possible that Justice Harry Blackmun and Justice
John Paul Stevens may retire within the next few years. 3
C. The Firstpost-Bray Decision
The Second Circuit wrote the first post-Bray decision - Town
of West Hartford Summit Women's Center West v. Operation
Rescue.232 The holding interpreted Bray narrowly, and remanded the
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case for further inquiries.23 The case began with a series of massive
abortion demonstration in 1989 at the Summit Women's Center West
in West Hartford."' The district court granted a permanent
injunction against Operation Rescue in a summary judgement ruling
on the Center's § 1985(3) claim, from which Operation Rescue
appealed.23 The appellate court analyzed the court's holding in Bray
in detail,2 36 noting the appellants reliance on Bray.237 However, the
appellate court responded: "To the extent that appellants are
contending that Bray forecloses all resort to 1985(3) in all instances
involving 'persons obstructing access to abortion clinics,' we think
appellants have over-read what the Court announced. , 238 While the
appellate court agreed that Bray meant that women seeking abortions
are not a class protected by § 1985(3), and that animus directed
against women as a whole is not demonstrated, they felt that the
"Court's analysis of the animus aspect of Bray is tied to the facts
there adduced. , 239 The appellate court remanded the case for a closer
examination of the animus aspect and whether a protected right was
inhibited by the district court in light of Bray. ° Abortion supporters
praised the ruling, with Ruth Jones, an attorney for NOW,
commenting: "It's very exciting the Second Circuit appears to be
taking a narrow view of Bray."24' However, others feel that the
animus avenue was clearly decided in Bray.242 One of the attorneys
representing Operation Rescue noted that "Justice Scalia couldn't
have been clearer in finding that opposition to abortion in the form
of clinic blockades, does not constitute an animus toward women. "243
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On October 4, 1993, the Supreme Court denied a writ of
certiorari from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2' and
the case is remanded to Judge Peter C. Dorsey of the District Court
of Connecticut.245 He will now decide if the facts of this case differ
sufficiently from those of Bray to justify maintaining the
injunctions.'
Jon Schoenhorn, the Hartford attorney representing
Summit, believes that although the Bray decision indicates that mass
abortion protests and clinic invasion are not discriminatory against
women, claims which show a conspiracy to interfere with law
enforcement in the context of a protest can be sustained.247
IV. Conclusion
Pro-choice groups have been hard hit by the removal of the
highly effective § 1985(3)claim against anti-abortion protestors.
Without the backing of federal force and the economic impact on
abortion-protest groups provided under § 1985(3), it will prove
difficult, if not impossible, for abortion clinics to remain open and
for local authorities to maintain the status quo. Thus, while the
Supreme Court keeps chipping away at the right to abortion itself, the
decision in Bray may make an outright overturning of Roe v. Wade
unnecessary. If women cannot get into the clinics to exercise their
right to abortion, then the right will cease to exist. Thus, the fate of
women seeking abortion in this country hangs in the balance.
Suzanne Pence Ferguson
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